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Abstract
Web sites where users create and rate content as well
as form networks with other users display long-tailed
distributions in many aspects of behavior. Using be-
havior on one such community site, Essembly, we pro-
pose and evaluate plausible mechanisms to explain
these behaviors. Unlike purely descriptive models,
these mechanisms rely on user behaviors based on
information available locally to each user. For Es-
sembly, we find the long-tails arise from large differ-
ences among user activity rates and qualities of the
rated content, as well as the extensive variability in
the time users devote to the site. We show that the
models not only explain overall behavior but also al-
low estimating the quality of content from their early
behaviors.
1 Introduction
Participatory web sites facilitate their users creat-
ing, rating and sharing content. Examples include
Digg[.com] for news stories, Flickr[.com] for photos
and Wikipedia[.org] for encyclopedia articles. To aid
users in finding content, many such sites employ col-
laborative filtering [19] to allow users to specify links
to other users whose content or ratings are particu-
larly relevant. These links can involve either people
who already know each other (e.g., friends) or people
who discover their common interests through partic-
ipating in the web site. In addition to helping iden-
tify relevant content, the resulting networks enable
users to find others with similar interests and estab-
lish trust in recommendations [13].
The availability of activity records from these sites
has led to numerous studies of user behavior and
the networks they create. Observed commonalities
in these systems suggest general generative processes
leading to these observations. Examples include pref-
erential attachment in forming networks and multi-
plicative processes leading to wide variation in user
activity. While such models provide a broad under-
standing of the observations, they often lack causal
connection with plausible user behaviors based on
user preferences and the information available to
users in making their decisions [29, 5]. Moreover,
observed behavior can arise from a variety of mecha-
nisms [23].
For predicting consequences of alternate designs of
the web site, models including causal behavior are
necessary. Establishing such models is more difficult
than simply observing behavior: due to the possi-
bility of confounding factors in observations, many
different causal models can produce the same obser-
vations. Instead, such models would ideally use inter-
vention studies and randomized trials to identify im-
portant causal relationships. In contrast to the wide
availability of observational data on user behavior,
such intervention studies are difficult, though this is
situation is improving with the increasing feasibility
of experiments in large virtual communities [4] and
large-scale web-based experiments [27].
Nevertheless, identifying information readily avail-
able to users on a participatory web site can suggest
plausible causal mechanisms. Such models provide
specific hypotheses to test with future intervention
experiments and also suggest improvements to over-
all system behavior by altering the user experience,
e.g., available information or incentives. The simplest
such approach considers average behavior of users on
a site [21]. Such models can indicate how system be-
havior relates to the average decisions of many users.
By design, such models do not address a prominent
aspect of observed online networks: the long tails in
their distributions of links and activity. Models in-
cluding this diversity could be useful to improve effec-
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tiveness of the web sites by allowing focus on signif-
icantly active users or especially interesting content,
and enhancing user experience by leveraging the long
tail in niche demand [3].
A key question with respect to the observed diver-
sity is whether users, content and the networks are
reasonably viewed as behaviors arising from a sta-
tistically homogeneous population, and hence well-
characterized by a mean and variance. Or is diver-
sity of intrinsic characteristics among participants the
dominant cause of the observed wide variation in be-
haviors? In the latter case, can these characteris-
tics be estimated (quickly) from (a few) observations
of behavior, allowing site design to use estimates of
these characteristics, e.g., to highlight especially in-
teresting content? Moreover, to the extent user di-
versity is important, what is a minimal characteriza-
tion of this user variation sufficient to produce the
observed long-tail distributions?
This paper considers these questions in the context
of a politically-oriented web community, Essembly1.
Unlike most such sites, Essembly provides multiple
networks with differing nominal semantics, which is
useful for distinguishing among some models. We
consider plausible mechanisms users could be follow-
ing to produce the observed long-tail behaviors both
in their online activities and network characteristics.
In the remainder of this paper, we first describe Es-
sembly and our data set in Sec. 2. We then sep-
arately examine highly variable behaviors for users,
content rating and network formation, in Secs. 3, 4,
and 5, respectively. We suggest models to describe
the observed characteristics of users, content, and the
network, and consider their possible use during op-
eration of the web site by helping identify user and
content parameters early in their history. Finally we
discuss implications and extensions to other partici-
patory web sites.
In the three sections focusing on user behavior,
resolve characteristics, and network structure, re-
spectively, we first introduce the observations, then
present a model describing these observations (sub-
sections Model), and finally analyze the model pa-
rameters and predictions (subsections Behavior).
2 Essembly
Essembly is an online service helping users engage in
political discussion through creating and voting on
1Essembly LLC at www.essembly.com
resolves reflecting controversial issues. Essembly pro-
vides three distinct networks for users: a social net-
work, an ideological preference network, and an anti-
preference network, called friends (those who know
each other in person), allies (those who share similar
ideologies) and nemeses (those who have opposing
ideologies), respectively.
The distinct social and ideological networks en-
able users to distinguish between people they know
personally and people encountered on the site with
whom they tend to agree or disagree. Network links
are formed by invitation only and each link must be
approved by the invitee. Thus all three networks in
Essembly are explicitly created by users. Essembly
provides a ranked list of ideologically most similar or
dissimilar users based on voting history, thus users
can identify potential allies or nemeses by comparing
profiles. With regards to voting activity, the Essem-
bly user interface presents several options for users to
discover new resolves, for instance based on votes by
network neighbors, recency, overall popularity, and
degree of controversy.
Our data set consists of anonymized voting records
for Essembly between its inception in August 2005
and December 2006, and the users and the links they
have at that time in the three networks at the end of
this period. Our data set has 15, 424 users. Essembly
presents 10 resolves during the user registration pro-
cess to establish an initial ideological profile used to
facilitate users finding others with similar or different
political views. To focus on user-created content, we
consider the remaining 24, 953 resolves, with a total
of 1.3 million votes.
3 Users
Fig. 1 shows most users are active for only a short
time (less than a day), as measured by the time be-
tween their first and last votes (this includes votes
on the initial resolves during registration – users need
not vote on all of them immediately). The 4762 users
active for at least a day account for most of the votes
and links, and we focus on these active users for our
model. For these users, Fig. 1 shows an exponen-
tial fit to the activity distribution for intermediate
times. Thus users who have sufficient interest in the
system to participate for at least a few days behave
approximately as if they decide to stop participating
as a Poisson process. The additional decrease at long
times (above 200 days or so) is due to the finite length
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Figure 1: Distribution of activity times for users. The
line shows an exponential fit to the values between
10 and 200 days, proportional to e−t/τ where τ =
124 days.
of our data sample (about 500 days).
About a fifth of users have no votes on noninitial
resolves. For the rest of the users, Fig. 2 shows the
distribution of votes among users who voted at least
once for noninitial resolves. These votes are close to
a Zipf distribution in number of votes, with number
of users with v votes proportional to v−ν−1. The
parameter estimates and confidence intervals in this
and the other figures are maximum likelihood esti-
mates [24, 17] assuming independent samples. This
wide variation in user activity also occurs in other
participatory web sites such as Digg [22].
The distribution of number votes per user arises
from two factors: how long users participate before
becoming inactive, and how often they vote while ac-
tive.
3.1 Model
Fig. 3 summarizes our model for user behavior. This
models the participation of users and their activities
on the site while they are active. New users arrive in
the system when they register, and we model this as
a Poisson process with rate α, and such users leave
the system (i.e., become inactive) with a rate 1/τ .
Table 1 gives the values for these model parameters
based on average arrival and activity times of active
users.
User activities consist of voting, creating resolves,
and forming links. User activity is clumped in time,
with groups of many votes close in time separated by
gaps of at least several hours. This temporal struc-
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Figure 2: Distribution of number of users vs. the
number of votes a user made. The solid curve in-
dicates a Zipf distribution fit to the values, with pa-
rameter ν = 0.45 ± 0.01. In this and other figures
the range given with the parameter estimate is the
95% confidence interval. The plot does not include
the 2984 users with zero votes.
parameter value
new user rate α = 9.3/day
activity time constant τ = 124 days
resolve creation q = 0.018± 0.0002
link creation λ = 0.043± 0.0003
Table 1: User activity parameters.
ture can be viewed as a sequence of user sessions. The
averaged distributions for interevent times between
activities of individuals show long-tail behavior, sim-
ilarly to other observed human activity patterns, such
as email communications or web site visits [30]. To
model the number of votes per user in the long time
limit where we are only interested in the total num-
ber of accumulated votes for a particular user, this
clumping of votes in time is not important. Specif-
ically we suppose each user has an average activity
rate ρ while they are active on the site (cf. Fig. 1),
given as ρu = eu/Tu, where ρu is user u’s activity, eu
is her number of events (i.e., votes, resolve creations
and links), and Tu is the time elapsed between her
first and last vote. We suppose the ρu values arise
as independent choices from a distribution Puser(ρu)
and the values are independent of the length of time
a user is active on the site. These properties are
only weakly correlated (correlation coefficient −0.06
among active users).
We characterize user activities by fractions q and λ
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Figure 3: Model of user behavior. People join the site
as active users, who create resolves, vote on them and
link to other active users. Users can eventually stop
participating and become inactive.
for creating resolves and forming links, respectively.
The rate of voting on existing resolves for a user is
then ρu(1− q−λ), which is by far the most common
of the three user activities. For simplicity, we treat
these choices as independent and take q and λ to
be the same for all users. Thus in our model, the
variation among users is due to their differing overall
activity rates ρu and amount of time they are active
on the site Tu.
3.2 Behavior
We estimate the model parameters from the observed
user activities, and restrict attention to active users.
Table 1 shows the estimates for parameters, q and
λ, governing activity choices. Fig. 4 shows the ob-
served cumulative distribution ρu values and a fit to
a lognormal distribution.
The heavy tailed nature of the votes per user dis-
tribution (Fig. 2) can be attributed to the interplay
between the user activity times Tu and the broad log-
normal distribution of the user activity rates ρu: the
mixture of these two distributions results in a power
law, as has been shown in the context of web page
links as well [16].
The distributions of activity times and rates pre-
sumably reflect the range of dedication of users to
the site, where most users are trying the service for
a very limited time but active users are also repre-
sented in the heavy tail. Such extended distributions
of user activity rates is also seen in other activities,
including use of web sites, e.g., Digg [22], and scien-
tific productivity [28].
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Figure 4: Cumulative distribution of activity rates,
ρu, for the 4719 users who were active at least one
day and voted on at least one noninitial resolve or
formed at least on link. Plot includes a curve for a
lognormal distribution fit, which is indistinguishable
from the points and with parameters µ = 0.03± 0.05
and σ = 1.70 ± 0.04. The ρ values are in units of
actions per day.
4 Resolves
A key question for user-created content is how user
activities distribute among the available content. For
Essembly, Fig. 5 shows the total number of votes per
resolve. This distribution covers a wide range, with
some resolves receiving many times as many votes
as the median. In Essembly, each resolve receives
its first vote when it is created, i.e., the vote of the
user introducing the resolve. Thus the observed votes
on a resolve are a combination of two user activi-
ties: creating a new resolve (giving the resolve its
first vote) and subsequently other users choosing to
vote on the resolve if they see it while visiting the
site. We note that users do not see the distribution
of previous votes until they cast their votes, so that
their judgement is unbiased. After voting, they can
see how other users had voted on the resolve.
We consider a user’s selection of an existing re-
solve to vote on as mainly due to a combination of
two factors: visibility and interestingness of a resolve
to a user. Visibility is the probability a user finds
the resolve during a visit to the site. Interestingness
is the conditional probability a user votes on the re-
solve given it is visible to that user. These two factors
apply to a variety of web sites, e.g., providing a de-
scription of average behavior on Digg [21].
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Figure 5: Distribution of votes on resolves. The solid
curve indicates a double Pareto lognormal fit to the
values, with parameters α = 2.4± 0.1, β = 2.5± 0.1,
µ = 3.67± 0.02 and σ = 0.38± 0.02.
The design of the web site’s user interface deter-
mines content visibility. Typically sites, including Es-
sembly, emphasize recently created content and pop-
ular content (i.e., receiving many votes over a period
of time). Essembly also emphasizes controversial re-
solves. As with other networking sites, the user in-
terface highlights resolves with these properties both
globally and among the user’s network neighbors.
Users can also find resolves through a search inter-
face. While we cannot observe which resolves people
click on, we do register when they vote on them, and
thus find it interesting enough to warrant spending
time to consider them.
In a similar vein, clickthrough rates have been ex-
tensively investigated in the context of web search
and search engine optimization. Web search engines
strive to provide users with relevant results to their
queries, and rank the matching documents in reverse
order of perceived importance to the searcher. How-
ever, due to the fact that search queries are not
well defined and several possible optimal results may
match a user’s request, it is not always the top ranked
result that is most relevant to the user. Search en-
gine logs provide data on which results users click
on for given queries, and thus can reveal users’ im-
plicit relevance judgements to their searches. It has
been shown, however, that the probability of click-
ing on a given result is biased by the presentation
order, thus a result with the same relevance as an-
other but appearing in a higher poisition may get
more clicks (this is also called “trust bias”) [10, 9].
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Figure 6: Distribution of votes vs. age of a resolve.
Eyetracking experiments have also shown that users
scan through search results in a linear order from top
to bottom, which further explains why results on the
top are clicked with a larger probability [18]. Click-
throughs are analogous to votes cast on resolves in
Essembly, indicating a preference on the part of the
user for the given item found for the query during
a web search, and the resolve voted on in Essembly,
respectively. Predictive models have been developed
to compensate for position bias and to offset it to re-
veal the true relevance of the search results for the
users [1, 8].
In Essembly, recency appears to be the most signif-
icant factor affecting visibility, in a very similar man-
ner to how search engine users perceive the ranked
results. Fig. 6 shows how votes distribute according
to the age of the resolve at the time of the vote. We
define the age of the resolve as the ordinality of the
given resolve among resolves introduced in time. An
age 1 resolve is the newest one of the resolves intro-
duced, while the oldest resolve has age R where R
is the number of resolves. Most votes go to recent
resolves with a small age.
The decay in votes with age is motivated by re-
cency (decreasing visibility with age as resolve moves
down, and eventually off, the list of recent resolves).
We offer no underlying model for this “aging func-
tion” but its overall power-law form corresponds to
users’ willingness to visit successive pages or scroll
down a long list [16]. The step at age 50 is, pre-
sumably, due to a limit on number of recent resolves
readily accessible to users. The values decrease as a
power law, proportional to a−s, where a is resolve age
and s ≈ 0.5 up to about age 50. For larger ages, the
values in Fig. 6 decreases faster, with s ≈ −1. It has
5
also been found that in search engine result pages the
probability of clicking on a result also decreases with
the rank of the result as a power law, albeit with a
different exponent (−1.6) [20, 12].
The combination of different ages in the data sam-
ple is a significant factor in producing the observed
distributions [15]. In particular, a distribution of ages
and a multiplicative process produces a lognormal
distribution with power-law tails, the double Pareto
lognormal distribution [26], with four parameters.
Two parameters, µ and σ characterize the location
and width of the center of the distribution. The re-
maining parameters characterize the tails: α for the
power-law decay in the upper tail, with number of re-
solves with v votes proportional to v−α−1, and β for
the power-law growth in the lower tail, with number
of resolves proportional to vβ−1. Fig. 5 shows a fit
of this distribution to the numbers of votes different
resolves received. For Essembly, the networks have
only a modest influence on voting [14].
4.1 Model
Our model of resolve creation, described in Sec. 3,
involves a fraction q of each user’s activity on the
site, on average, giving each resolve its first vote. For
subsequent votes, we view a user’s choice of resolve
as due to an intrinsic interestingness property r of
each resolve and its visibility.
In general r could depend on the resolve age and
its popularity (especially among network neighbors,
if neighbors influence a user to vote rather than just
make a resolve more visible). However, for simplicity,
we take r to be constant for a resolve. A key mo-
tivation for this choice is the observation that high
or low rates of voting on a resolve tend to persist
over time, when controlling for the age and number
of votes the resolve already has. Thus the importance
of an intrinsic interestingness property of resolves is a
reasonable approximation for Essembly (as discussed
further in Sec. 6). We further assume r is indepen-
dent of the user, which amounts to considering gen-
eral interest in resolves among the population rather
than considering possible niche interests among sub-
groups of users. With these simplifications, we take
the r values to arise as independent choices from a
distribution Presolve(r).
Visibility of a resolve depends on age, rank in num-
ber of votes compared with other resolves (popular-
ity), controversy, both in general and among user’s
neighbors. For Essembly, resolve age appears to be
interval
resolve I1 I2 I3 I4
1 f(1)r1v1 f(2)r1v2 f(3)r1v3 f(4)r1v4
2 − f(1)r2v2 f(2)r2v3 f(3)r2v4
3 − − f(1)r3v3 f(2)r3v4
4 − − − f(1)r4v4
Table 2: Model of distribution of votes among re-
solves in time intervals between successive resolve in-
troductions, here shown for the first four resolves.
the most significant factor, so we take visibility to be
a function of age a alone, as determined by a function
f(a).
With these factors, we model the chance that the
next vote on existing resolves goes to resolve j as be-
ing proportional to rjf(aj) where aj is the age of the
resolve at the time of the vote. The model’s behavior
is unchanged by an overall multiplicative constant,
and we arbitrarily set f(1) = 1.
4.2 Behavior
We would like to estimate the distribution Presolve
and the aging function f(a). To do so, we consider
the votes (other than the first vote on each resolve)
between successive resolve introductions. Specifi-
cally, let R be the number of resolves in our data
sample. We denote the resolves in the order they
were introduced, ranging from 1 to R.
Let us assume that there have i resolves been in-
troduced in Essembly up to a given time, and let vi
be the number of votes made in the time interval Ii
between the introductions of resolves i and i+1 (not
including the two votes accompanying those resolve
introductions). During this interval, the system has
i existing resolves as assumed. When the number of
existing resolves is large, we can treat the votes go-
ing to each resolve as approximately independent. In
this case, the number of votes resolve j ≤ i receives
during time interval Ii is a Poisson process with mean
virjf(i−j+1) because during this interval resolve j is
of age i−j+1. Table 2 illustrates these relationships.
We estimate the rj and f(a) values as those max-
imizing the likelihood of getting the observed num-
bers of votes on the resolves in these time intervals,
coming from independent Poisson distributions. This
maximization does not have a simple closed form, but
setting derivatives with respect to these parameters
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Figure 7: Cumulative distribution of r values for
the resolves as obtained from a maximum likeli-
hood estimate for the observed data. The curve
shows a lognormal distribution fit, with parameters
µ = −3.11± 0.01 and σ = 0.69± 0.01.
to zero does give simple relations between these val-
ues at the maximum:
rj =
vresolvej∑R−j+1
a=1 f(a)va+j−1
(1)
f(a) =
vagea∑R−a+1
j=1 rjva+j−1
(2)
where vresolvej is the number of votes resolve j has re-
ceived, vagea is the number of votes made to resolves of
age a at the time of the vote, in both cases excluding
the initial vote to each resolve. The resulting f(a)
estimates from the numerical solution are similar to
the distribution of votes vs. age in Fig. 6, and Fig. 7
shows the distribution of estimated r values and a
lognormal fit.
With the wide variation in r values for resolves and
the activity rates for users (Fig. 4), a natural question
is whether these variations are related. In particular,
whether the most active users tend to preferentially
introduce resolves that are especially interesting to
other users. While active users tend to introduce
more resolves overall, the correlation between the ac-
tivity rate of a user and the average r values of the
resolves introduced by that user is small: −0.06. We
find a modest correlation (0.16) between the time a
user is active on the site and the mean r values of
that user’s introduced resolves.
To relate this model to the vote distribution of
Fig. 5, consider the votes received by resolve j up
to and including the time it is of age A. According
to our model, the number of votes, other than its first
vote, this resolve receives is a Poisson variable Vj(A)
with mean
µj(A) = rj
A∑
a=1
f(a)vj+a−1
At the end of our data set, resolve j is of age R−j+1.
The persistence of votes on resolves based on the
wide variation of r values among resolves gives rise
to a multiplicative process with decay. To see this, in
our model the number of votes between successive re-
solve introductions is geometrically distributed with
mean vˆ = (1 − q − λ)/q ≈ 52. Furthermore, from
Fig. 6, the aging function is approximately power
law, with f(a) ≈ a−s and
∑A
a=1 f(a) ∼ A
1−s/(1−s).
The expected number of votes up to age A is then
µj(A) ∼ rj vˆA
1−s/(1 − s). After accumulating many
votes (i.e., when A is large), the actual number of
votes Vj(A) will usually be close to this expected
value. The change in votes to age A+ 1 is
Vj(A+ 1) ≈ rj vˆ
A1−s
1− s
(1 + x)
≈ Vj(A)(1 + x)
where x is a nonnegative random variable with mean
(1 − s)/A. Thus, except possibly for the votes a
resolve receives shortly after its introduction, the
growth in number of votes is well-described by a mul-
tiplicative process with decay.
That our model corresponds to a multiplicative
process has two consequences. First, a sample ob-
tained at a range of ages from a multiplicative process
(with or without decay) leads to the double Pareto
lognormal distribution seen in Fig. 5. In our case,
the sample has a uniform range of ages from 1 to
R, though with the decay older resolves accumulate
votes more slowly than younger ones. A second con-
sequence arises from the decay as resolves become
less visible over time. Thus our model provides one
mechanism using locally available information giving
rise to dynamics governed by multiplicative random
variation with decay. A similar process arises if the
decay is due to any combination of decreasing inter-
est in the content and loss of visibility with age, e.g.,
as seen in sites such as Digg [31] with current events
stories that become less relevant over time.
As one indication of the diversity of voting on re-
solves, Fig. 8 shows how the average r value for re-
solves receiving votes compares to the average for all
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Figure 8: Ratio of means of r estimates for resolves
receiving votes at or after various ages to the r esti-
mates for all resolves of those ages. Error bars indi-
cate the standard error in the ratio of means from the
standard deviation of the r values and the number of
resolves in each category.
resolves among those at least a given age. Random-
ization tests indicate average r values of resolves re-
ceiving votes are unlikely to be the same as those of
all resolves at each of these ages, with p-values less
than 10−3 in all cases. With increasing age, resolves
continuing to receive votes tend to be those with es-
pecially high r values. This behavior indicates that
high interestingness estimates for resolves persist over
time, as a small subset of resolves continue to collect
votes well after their introduction.
5 Links
Users’ decisions of who to link to and how they at-
tend to the behavior of their neighbors can signif-
icantly affect the performance of participatory web
sites. A common property of such networks is the
wide range in numbers of links made by users, i.e.,
the degree distribution of the network. The struc-
ture of the networks is typical of those seen in online
social networking sites, and the links created by users
generally conform to their nominal semantics [14].
The degree distributions in all three Essembly net-
works are close to a truncated power law [25], with
number of users in the network with degree d propor-
tional to d−τe−d/κ. Fig. 9 shows the distribution of
degrees in the networks.
These long-tail degree distributions are often
viewed as due to a preferential attachment process in
which users tend to form links with others in propor-
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Figure 9: The number of users in the Essembly social
network who have a given number of links of the in-
dicated type (plus symbols are for the friends, circles
for the allies, and squares for the nemeses networks,
respectively). The parameters of the best fits of trun-
cated power laws on the three sets of data are given
in the text.
tion to how many links they already have. Combined
with a limitation on the number of links a user has,
this process gives truncated power-law degree distri-
butions [2]. For Essembly, this limitation arises from
users becoming inactive, since such users no longer
accept links. However, users in Essembly have no di-
rect access to number of links of other users. Thus we
need to identify a mechanism users could use, based
on information available to them.
The mechanism underlying preferential attach-
ment likely differs between the friends network and
the two ideological ones. In particular, since the links
appear to follow their nominal semantics [14], links in
the friends network are likely to be mainly between
people who know each other (i.e., not found via Es-
sembly) while ideological links (especially those who
are not also friends) require finding the people by
ideological profile (which Essembly makes available).
Building such a profile requires voting, so a user with
many votes is more likely to have voted on similar
resolves as other users. Such common votes allow
ideological comparisons between users and therefore
suggestions for potential users to link to.
The need to build ideological profiles suggests votes
on common resolves is key to the number and type
of links. That is, a user forming a link is more likely
to have many common votes with other users who
are very active (and hence have many votes). Thus
forming links based on common votes is likely to lead
8
people to link preferentially to highly active users,
who will in turn tend to have many links.
One challenge to evaluating this mechanism is cau-
sation: resolves voted on by network neighbors are
highlighted in the user interface, making them more
visible and hence more likely to receive votes. Thus
common votes increase the chances of forming a link
by providing information to form a profile, and links
increase the chance of common votes through visibil-
ity of resolves. Separating these effects is especially
challenging since our data set does not indicate when
each link was formed.
We can partially address this challenge through
two observations. First, Essembly presents “resolves
in your network” grouping the three networks to-
gether. So any influence on resolve visibility due to
networks should be similar for all networks. Second,
Fig. 10 illustrates a distinction between the ideologi-
cal networks in Essembly and the social network nom-
inally linking people who know each other as friends.
The figure shows friends generally have many more
resolves in common, i.e., both users voted on, than
random pairs of users who participate in at least one
of the networks. The figure also shows the ideolog-
ical networks (both allies and nemeses) are similar
and have significantly more common resolves than
the friends network.
These two observations suggest the enhanced num-
ber of common votes for the friends network com-
pared to random pairs is primarily due to the in-
creased visibility of resolves due to network neighbors
voting on them. Because Essembly presents resolves
from all networks together, this enhancement is also
likely to be the same for the ideological networks.
Hence, the remaining increase in common votes in
the ideological networks compared to the friends net-
work suggests the additional commonality required
for users to form the links.
Fig. 11 shows the types of links vary depending
on user activity. For this plot, users with at least
one network connection are grouped into quantiles
by their number of votes. Each point on the plot is
the average fraction of link types among users in that
quantile, with the error bar indicating the standard
deviation of this estimate of the mean. Users with
few votes tend to have most of their links to friends
only, so do not participate much in the ideological
networks. On the other hand, users with many votes
tend to have most of their links in the ideological
networks and to people who are not also friends. The
same trend in link types occurs as a function of other
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Figure 10: Cumulative distribution of number of
common votes among linked pairs in the networks,
and among random pairs of users who are in at least
one network. For each number of common votes, the
curves show the fraction of pairs with more than that
many resolves both users in the pair voted on.
measures of user activity, i.e., using quantiles based
on the time a user is active or the number of links a
user has.
5.1 Model
In our model, user u forms links at a rate λρu. Thus
the number of links a user forms is a combination
of activity rate and how long the user remains at
the site. The wide variation in activity times and
ρu among users (Fig. 1 and 4) gives rise to a wide
distribution of number of links.
While the most common mechanisms designed to
reproduce the observed power law degree distribu-
tions use growing rules and the degree of vertices
in link formation [11], in the following we propose
a mechanism that only takes into account the extent
to which two users share interests to describe link
formation between two users.
Because links involve two people, an additional
modeling issue is which pairs of users form links. In
our model, we take the friends network to primarily
reflect a preexisting social network. For the ideologi-
cal networks, however, we take the choices to depend
on common votes. Furthermore, only active users
can form links. Specifically, we model the likelihood
a (non-friend) pair forms a link in an ideological net-
work as proportional to the number of common votes
they have. In addition, existing friends links can add
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Figure 11: Fraction of link types vs. number of votes
on noninitial resolves. A linked pair of users are de-
noted “only friends” when their only link is in the
friends network, “non-friends” when they are not
linked in the friends network, and “friends & ideo-
logical” when they have a friends link as well as a
link in the allies or nemeses networks.
an ideological link.
People form ideological links based on common
votes, and only users active at the same time can
form links. The first factor gives more links for those
who vote a lot (due to being more likely to have votes
in common with others). This leads to, in effect,
preferential attachment for forming links (those with
more links are likely to be users with more votes,
hence more overlap with others), while the attach-
ment probability does not explicitly depend on de-
grees. The activity constraint limits the link growth,
corresponding to descriptive models giving truncated
power-law degree distribution [2].
5.2 Behavior
To verify whether users connect to each other based
on similarities in their voting profile, we propose the
following simplified mechanism for link formation.
Suppose that user A voted on NA resolves, while user
B voted on NB resolves in total. Assuming that A
and B form a link with a probability proportional to
the number of votes that the pair has in common,
this probability will be Pl(A,B) ∝ NANB if NA and
NB are sufficiently smaller than the number of all
resolves, and A and B vote independently of each
other and pick resolves randomly from the pool of all
available resolves. Caldarelli et al. have shown that if
vertices in a network possess intrinsic “fitnesses”, and
the linking probability is proportional to the product
of fitnesses of the two vertices to be linked, then in
the particular case when the fitnesses are drawn from
a power-law probability distribution function the re-
sulting degree distribution will have the same expo-
nent as the fitness distribution [7]. We can consider
the number of votes a person makes as the fitness of
the vertex, and arrive by analogy at the same model
as Ref. [7], resulting in an expected power-law expo-
nent of −1.45 (Fig. 2).
Fitting truncated power laws to the degree distri-
butions of the three networks shown in Fig. 9, we
found the parameters τF = 1.25± 0.04, κF = 27± 4;
τA = 1.20± 0.04, κA = 59± 9; and τN = 1.44± 0.11,
κN = 18 ± 6 for the friends, allies, and nemeses
networks, respectively, with the values for the 95%
confidence intervals indicated. The power-law expo-
nents are in the range [1.20, 1.44], giving a consistent
match to the exponent of Fig. 2. The truncation of
the power laws seen in the degree distributions are
most likely the result of vertices gradually becom-
ing inactive in time. An interesting consequence of
the above is that while the friends network as seen
on Essembly is supposed to not be a result of shared
votes made conspicuous by the web user interface, we
see a consistent match in the exponents: this suggests
that friendship links in real life may also form around
shared interests, and that the scope of interests peo-
ple have may follow a similar probability distribution
function as shown in Fig. 2.
Unlike random graph models with this degree dis-
tribution [25], our mechanism based on common
votes also gives significant transitivity, comparable
to that observed for the allies network. That is, if
users A and B have voted on many resolves in com-
mon, as have users B and C, then users A and C also
tend to have significant overlap in the resolves they
voted on.
A further consequence of our model with ideologi-
cal links depending on common votes is the prediction
of a change in the types of links users make as they
vote. In particular, users with few votes will also have
few common votes with other users and hence their
links will tend to be mostly friends. Users with many
votes, on the other hand, will tend to have common
votes with many others and hence, according to this
model, tend to have mostly ideological links. This
change in type of links as a function of a user’s num-
ber of votes or links occurs in Essembly, as seen in
Fig. 11.
Finally, our model also describes the significant
fraction of users who form no links as due to a combi-
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Figure 12: Estimates of ρ values for several users as a
function of the time since their first vote. Error bars
show the 95% confidence intervals.
nation of low activity rate ρ and short activity time
t. Specifically, in our model the probability a user
has no links is e−λρt. For active users, whose activ-
ity time distribution is roughly exponential with time
constant τ , the values in Table 1 and the distribution
of ρ values in Fig. 4 give the probability for no links
as the average value of e−λρt equal to 23%. This
compares with the 1242 out of 4762 active users (i.e.,
26%) who have no links in our data set.
6 Online Estimation
Our model allows estimating parameters for new
users and new resolves as they act in the system. In
particular, we describe using the early history of re-
solves to estimate the number of votes a resolve will
eventually have as well as which resolve will likely
receive the next vote.
Fig. 12 shows estimates of user activity levels as a
function of time since the user first voted. We see
user activity levels change with time, and in different
ways. So users not only differ considerably in their
average activity rates but also in how their interest
in the site varies in time.
For resolves, using the model of Sec. 4, Fig. 13
shows how estimates for resolves, and their confidence
intervals change over time, as more votes are ob-
served. Other resolves show similar behavior. Thus
the interestingness of resolves appears to converge in
time as we expect.
In practice, however, the optimization procedure is
computationally very costly due to the large number
of parameters that grows linearly with the number
of resolves in the system. A further requirement of
an online algorithm is that it is able to update the
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Figure 13: Estimates of r values for two resolves as
a function of their age. Error bars show the 95%
confidence intervals.
model parameters in real time as new users, votes and
resolves enter the system. Thus it is not feasible to
consider a growing number of resolves with constant
resources. Instead we must limit the the number of
parameters and thus resolves to be optimized to a
constant value.
One such approach is to optimize parameters based
on the last K active resolves only, and keep the inter-
estingness and aging parameters constant for resolves
older than that. This method, interestingly, has the
potential benefit of being able to track changes to
interestingness and aging in time.
Another incremental approach uses the observation
that old resolves, with a long track record of votes,
have their interestingness well-estimated and simi-
larly the aging function f(a) for small ages is well-
estimated from prior experience with many resolves
receiving votes at those ages. Conversely, recently in-
troduced resolves have had little time to accumulate
votes and f(a) for large ages is poorly estimated due
to having little experience in the system with resolves
that old. Furthermore, we can expect f(a) to change
slowly with time as primarily due to how the user in-
terface makes resolves visible to users. The maximum
likelihood estimation for these parameters described
in Sec. 4 requires a computationally expensive opti-
mization to find the best choices for rj and f(a) for
all values. For new resolves, with j close to R, Eq. (1)
determines the rj values in terms of the values of f(a)
for small ages (i.e., a = 1, . . . , R − j + 1) which are
already well-determined from the prior history of the
system. So instead of an expensive reevaluation of
all the r and f values, we can simply incrementally
estimate the r values of new resolves assuming f(a)
values for small ages do not change much. Conversely,
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as new resolves are introduced, the oldest resolves in
the system advance to ever larger ages, allowing esti-
mates of f(a) for those ages from Eq. (2) by assuming
the r values of those old resolves do not change much
with the introduction of new resolves.
Such estimates of model parameters can be useful
guides for improving social web sites if extended to
user behavior as well, by identifying new users likely
to become highly active or content likely to become
popular. Since it is possible to estimate the statistical
errors given the sample size, one can also perform risk
assessment when giving the estimates. Newly posted
content with high interestingness, for instance, can
be quickly identified and given prominent attention
on the online interface.
7 Discussion
We described several extended distributions resulting
from user behavior on Essembly, a web site where
users create and rate content as well as form net-
works. These distributions are common in participa-
tory web sites. From the extended distributions of
user behavior we find extremely heterogenous popu-
lation of users and resolves. We introduce a plausible
mechanism describing user behavior based on locally
available information, involving a combination of ag-
ing and a large variation among people and resolves.
We centered our investigations around three areas:
the wide range in user activity levels in online par-
ticipation; how online social networks form around
topical interests; and the factors that influence the
popularity of user-created content.
In particular, we found, first, that most users try
the online services only briefly, so most of the activity
arises from a relatively small fraction of users who ac-
count for the diverse behavior observed. Second, we
gave a plausible, quantitative explanation of the long-
tailed degree distributions observed in online commu-
nities, based on only the observed activity patterns of
users and the underlying collaborative mechanisms.
Our observations suggest different mechanisms un-
derly the formation of the social (friends) and ideo-
logical (allies and nemeses) networks, although these
mechanisms give similar outcomes, e.g., for the qual-
itative form of the degree distribution. The impli-
cations may extend beyond the scope of purely on-
line societies to describe other societal connections
as well where shared interests motivate relationship
formation. Our model, however, does not address
other significant properties of the networks, such as
community structure and assortativity and why they
differ among the three networks [14]. Nor does our
model address detailed effects on user behavior due
to their network neighbors. Third, we proposed a
model and algorithm that can describe and predict
through iterative refinements how the popularity of
user-generated submissions evolves in time, consid-
ering both their changing exposure online and their
inherent interestingness. We found that the exposure
that content receives depends largely on its recency,
and decays with age.
The characteristics of our models plausibly apply
to other web sites where user participation is self-
directed and where content creation and social link
formation plays a dominant part in the individual
online activities. The Digg and Wikipedia user com-
munities (those whose activity data is publicly avail-
able) in particular may show similar behavior in their
activity patterns. Our models could be extended to
include the weak, but nevertheless statistically sig-
nificant, correlations among user behaviors such as
activity rate and the time they remain active on the
site. Including such correlations, as well as some his-
torical and demographic information on individual
users, may improve the model predictions as seen,
for example, in models estimating customer purchase
activities [6].
Consequences of our model include suggestions for
identifying active users and interesting resolves early
in their history. E.g., from persistence in voting rates
over time, even before accumulating enough votes to
be rated as popular. Such identification could be use-
ful to promote interesting content on the web site
more rapidly, particularly in the case of niche inter-
ests. Beyond helping users find interesting content,
designs informed by causal models could also help
with derivative applications, such as collaborative fil-
tering or developing trust and reputations, by quickly
focusing on the most significant users or items. Such
applications raise significant questions of the relevant
time scales. That is, observed behavior is noisy, so
there is a tradeoff between using a long time to accu-
mulate enough statistics to calibrate the model vs. us-
ing a short time to allow responsiveness faster than
other proxies for user interest such as popularity.
Our models raise additional questions on popula-
tion properties we used. One such question is under-
standing how the resolve aging function relates to the
user interface and changing interests among the user
population. Another question is how the wide distri-
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butions in user activity and resolve interestingness
arise. The lognormal fits suggest underlying mul-
tiplicative processes are involved. It would also be
interesting to extend the model to identify niche re-
solves, if any. That is, resolves of high interest to
small subgroups of users but not to the population as
a whole. Automatically identifying such subgroups
could help people find others with similar interests
by supplementing comparisons based on ideological
profiles.
A caveat on our results, as with other observa-
tional studies of web behavior, is the evidence for
mechanisms is based on correlations in observations.
While mechanisms proposed here are plausible causal
explanations since they rely on information and ac-
tions available to users, intervention experiments
would give more confidence in distinguishing corre-
lation from causal relationships. Our model provides
testable hypotheses for such experiments. For exam-
ple, if intrinsic interest in resolves is a major factor
in users’ selection of resolves, then deliberate changes
in the number of votes may change visibility but will
not affect interestingness. In that case, we would ex-
pect subsequent votes to return to the original trend.
Thus one area for experimentation is to determine
how users value content on various web sites. For
example, if items are valued mainly because others
value them (e.g., fashion items) then observed votes
would cause rather than just reflect high value. In
such cases, random initial variations in ratings would
be amplified, and show very different results if re-
peated or tried on separate subgroups of the popu-
lation. If items all have similar values and difference
mainly due to visibility, e.g., recency or popularity,
then we would expect votes due to rank order of votes
(e.g., whether item is most popular) rather than ab-
solute number of votes. If items have broad intrinsic
value, then voting would show persistence over time
and similar outcomes for independent subgroups. It
would also be useful to identify aspects of the model
that could be tested in small groups, thereby allowing
detailed and well-controlled laboratory experiments
comparing multiple interventions. Larger scale ex-
periments [4, 27] would also be useful to determine
the generality of these mechanisms.
The key features of continual arrival of new users,
existing users becoming inactive and a wide range of
activity levels among the user population and inter-
est in the content can apply in many contexts. For
the distribution of how user rate content (e.g., votes
on resolves in Essembly), generalizing to other situa-
tions will depend on the origin of perceived value to
the users. At one extreme, which seems to apply to
Essembly, the resolves themselves have a wide range
of appeal to the user population, leading some items
to consistently collect ratings at higher rates than
others. At the other extreme, perceived value could
be largely driven by popularity among the users, or
subgroups of users, as seen in some cultural prod-
ucts [27]. In rapidly changing situations, e.g., cur-
rent news events or blog posts, recency is important
not only in providing visibility through the system’s
user interface, but also determining the level of in-
terest. In other situations, the level of interest in
the items changes slowly, if at all, as appears to be
the case for resolves in Essembly concerning broad
political questions such as the benefits of free trade.
All these situations can lead to long-tail distributions
through a combination of a “rich get richer” multi-
plicative process and decay with age. But these sit-
uations have different underlying causal mechanisms
and hence different implications for how changes in
the site will affect user behavior. Thus, design and
evaluation of participatory web sites can benefit from
the availability of causal models.
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